Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy in Second World War

                Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy in Second World War

During interwar period, main aim of Turkish foreign policy was to keep status quo which determinated in Lozan Agreement. Therefore, Turkey supported anti-revisionist states in Europe. Relations with Balkan and Middle East states determinated accordance with status quo policy. Therefore, aim of Turkish foreign policy after Lozan was to create a comman security area to prevent any possible military intervention and on the other hand, to solve the problems in international relations in a peaceful way.[1]To provide that aims, after Italian revisionist purposes had occured in 1934, Turkey and Italian relations started to change for the worse. Also, in 1933, when Hitler came to power in Germany, they established good relations with Italy and  Hitler also had negative attitude about the Straits and these issues disturbed Turkey. But still Turkey had economic relations with Germany, because Germany believed they could make Turkey join to Axis powers.[2]These revisionist policies of Germany and Italy caused to change in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey attempted to establish a balance by approaching to Britain in Mediterranean Sea.

            Even if Turkey and Britain relations worsen due to Mosul issue in 1920s, in 1936, Montreux straits treaty caused to change in relations between Turkey and Britain and recovering the relations occured. [3]Soviet Union became most favoured state untill 1930. Except some fluctuation, Soviet Union remained as one of the most important element of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey and France relations didn’t develop as wanted due to Sancak issue in 1936 and it caused to worsen relations between two states untill 1939.

            Between 1935-1939, Nazi’ Germany started to change Versailles balance in Europe and western states experienced a German threat. Meanwhile, establishment of Roma-Berlin co-operation increased the threat. For Turkey, it’s important if this co-operation cause to increase Italian threat to Turkey.

            In those years, Turkey was attempting to create a security zone for herself. In 1934, between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey Balkan Entente had signed against revisionist states to protect peace in the Balkans. In 1937, to protect peace in the Middle East, Turkey signed Saadabad Pact with Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. [4]

            İsmet İnönü was president of Turkey during Second World War. Main aim of Turkey in that time was to stay out of the war.[5]Turkey had a strategically important geopolitical position, therefore states which involved the war wanted Turkey be ally of them in the war. Both sides put pressure on Turkey to take side with them but due to strategic position of Turkey, both sides didn’t want to lose friendship of Turkey. Therefore, Turkey could resist these pressures and stayed neutral untill last moments of the war.[6]

            Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939

A mutual assistance pact concluded in Ankara on October 19; it elaborated the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish declarations signed on May 12 and June 23, 1939, respectively. The treaty provided for British and French assistance to Turkey in the event of aggression against the latter and also provided for Turkish aid in the event of “an act of aggression, committed by a European power and leading to war in the Mediterranean Sea involving France and the United Kingdom.” Turkey was also obligated to give assistance to Greece and Rumania in the event that Great Britain and France were drawn into war in compliance with the British and French guarantees given to these states by declarations of Apr. 13, 1939. The treaty was to be in effect for 15 years. Protocol No. 2 attached to the treaty declared that “the obligations undertaken by Turkey as a result of the aforementioned treaty cannot compel Turkey to take action the result or consequence of which would be to draw it into armed conflict with the USSR.” The treaty had no practical value. During World War II, 1939–45, the Turkish government not only failed to aid the allies, but on June 18, 1941, it signed a friendship treaty with Germany. Turkey supplied Germany with strategic raw materials until the beginning of 1944.[7]Even if Turkish decision makers had signed this agreement, main aim of Turkish foreign policy was to stay out of the war. Due to German-Soviet raproachment, Turkey signed that agreement but main aim was still the same. İsmet İnönü had stated that policy and public opinion, party and parliament kept away from decision making process. İsmet İnönü determinated his policies accordance to Ottoman foreign policy culture, practice in Atatürk’ time, experiences of First World War. To stay out of the war, İsmet İnönü implemented policies very carefully.[8]

            The start of the war is generally held to be 1 September 1939, beginning with the German invasion of Poland; Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later. Therefore, Second World War had started. [9]When Germany attacked to France on May, 1940 and Italian support to Germany spreaded the war to the Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, Britan and France asked from Turkey to comply with alliance agreement and join to the war. But Turkey used protocol number 2 which was stating that If there is a Soviet threat, then Turkey had a right not to join to the war. When France was defeated so badly and earlier than predicted, Turkey enhanced her attitude to stay out of the war. There is no France pressure anymore due to their defeat and Britain realized that If they continued to pressure on Turkey, Turkey could take side with Axis. Turkey made Britain, Soviet Union and Germany believe that Turkey’ staying out of the war policy was in favour of them. It was a balance between them and Turkey could be able to implement that policy by creating balance between these three states.[10]

            Before Soviet invasion of Germany, Hitler wanted to see them as secure in Balkans. Therefore, they asked a non-aggression agreement to Turkey and at 18 June 1991 non-aggression pact had signed. At 22 June 1941, Germany attacked to Soviet Union and this caused a new situation for Turkish foreign policy. After that point, Turkey feared from Britain policy to let Soviet Union do what they wanted on the Straits. Then, Soviet Union gave guarantee to Turkey that they would show respect to Turkey’ territorial integrity.[11]During that period, Soviet Union and Britain saw sufficient if Turkey didn’t let Germans pass from the Straits and stayed out of war. Therefore, they supported Turkey’ territorial integrity.German attack to Soviet Union relieved Turkey because Turkey could announce her neutrality to both sides.

            This new situation and balance in the war caused raproachment between Soviet Union and Britain and Turkey feared from that raproachment because Turkish policy makers knew what that raproachment mean from First World War. Soviet Union gave guarantee to Turkey for not to intervene or respect to its borders but in 1941, Britain and Soviet Union occupied Iran and this let Turkish politicians fearing from occupation of Turkey also. Therefore, Turkey realized that Turkey should act realistic and shouldn’t believe every promise.[12]

            German army defeated in Stalingrad in 1943 which caused to recession of Germany. Ally powers success caused to change their policies over Turkey also. Allies asked from Turkey to join to the war with them, but Axis powers supported Turkey’ staying out of the war policy.[13]Churchill came to Turkey and negotiated with İnönü to convince but it didn’t happen. Turkey decided not to join the war but changed her attitude towards Ally powers and acted more positively. But Turkey felt that she is under threat of Axis and also Soviet Union at the same time due to its geopolitical and geostrategical position. Turkey used that position to take more military aid from Britain. [14] Britain increased its pressure over Turkey to enter the war in 1943 and threatened Turkey with not to give support after the war against Soviet aims. But Turkey didn’t change her attitude and protected its ‘outher war ally’ position and this caused to prevent spreading of the war.[15]

            Turkish policy makers demanded guarantee against Soviet threat and modernization of Turkish army and these demands accepted by Churchill.[16]In Moscow and Cairo conferences in 1943, Britain continuted to demand joint of Turkey to the war but again Turkey rejected untill enough aids are given. Churchill, Roosevelt and İsmet İnönü came together in Cairo and they increased the pressure over Turkey and Turkey agreed to join to the war as a principle but asked to modernization and giving the aid to Turkish army.[17]But negotiations had no result. Due to that reasons, in 1944, Britain started to implement standoff policy. Turkey decided to stay out of the war, even if her relations got worse with Britain.[18]

            Victory of Stalingrad changed Soviet Union policies. Offensive aims of Soviet Union over Turkey again emerged. Turkey abandoned her relations with Germany and arrested pro-nationalists to show her attempts against Germany and her rapproachment policy through Soviet Union and the West.[19]

            At the beginning of Second World War, Turkey appeared as ally of Britain and France and Turkey demonstrated her preference is as the West. But Turkey policy on war time caused to isolation of Turkey at the end of the war. Turkey had to deal with Soviet threat and demands. Turkey searched for support from the West to handle with these demands and threat.[20]At the end of the war, in 1945, Turkey declared war over Germany and Japan but didn’t join the war actually.

            To sum up, main foreign policy aim of Turkey was to stay away from the war. To ensure this, Turkey used balance policy between powerful states. Turkey didn’t want to be part of a war which had nothing about her. Turkey used its geopolitical and geostrategical position and stayed out of the war. Although there were pressure from great power to join the war, Turkey persuaded them not to join the war. As a result of this, Turkey had a great diplomatic success which is beyond her economic, military and political ability.

           

                        Bibliography

·         Akandere, Osman, Milli Şef Dönemi, İstanbul, 1998.

·         Armaoğlu, Fahir, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Ankara, 1993.

·         Ekinci, Necdet, İnönü Dönemi ve II. Dünya Savaşı Yılları, Genel Türk Tarihi, Ankara, 2002.

·         Gönlübol Mehmet – Sar Cem, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1939), Ankara, 1996.

·         Koçak, Cemil, Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi, Ankara, 1986.

·         Oran, Baskın, Türk Dış Politikası, İstanbul, 2001.

·         Seydi, Süleyman, İngiliz Özel Hareket Birimi’nin II. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye’deki Faaliyetleri, Türkler, C.16, Ankara, 2002.

·         Soysal, İsmail, Türk Dış Politikaları İçin Kılavuz, İstanbul, 1993.

·         Stig, Förster, Myriam, Gessler, The Ultimate Horror: Reflections on Total War and Genocide. In Roger Chickering, Stig Förster and Bernd Greiner, eds., A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

·         Uçarol, Rıfat, Siyasi Tarih, İstanbul, 1995.

·         Yalçın, Semih, Atatürk’ün Milli Dış Siyaseti, Ankara, 2000.

·         Yılmaz, Mustafa, “İnönü Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası“, Selçuk Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, Sayı: 8, Konya, 1999.

---

[1] Cemil Koçak, Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi, Ankara, Cilt: 1, 1986, p.229.

[2] Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Ankara, 1993, p. 353.

[3] Semih Yalçın, Atatürk’ün Milli Dış Siyaseti, Ankara, 2000, pp. 234-235.

[4] Fahir Armaoğlı, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, Ankara, 1993, p. 140.

[5] Necdet Ekinci, İnönü Dönemi ve II. Dünya Savaşı Yılları, Genel Türk Tarihi, Ankara, Cilt: 9, 2002, p. 646.

[6] Süleyman Seydi, İngiliz Özel Hareket Birimi’nin II. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye’deki Faaliyetleri, Türkler, Cilt: 16, Ankara, 2002, p. 823.

[7] The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition (1970-1970).

[8] Mustafa Yılmaz, İnönü Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası, Selçuk Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, No: 8, Konya, 1999, p. 17.

[9] Förster, Stig; Gessler, Myriam, The Ultimate Horror: Reflections on Total War and Genocide. In Roger Chickering, Stig Förster and Bernd Greiner, eds., A World at Total War: Global Conflict and the Politics of Destruction, 1937–1945, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 53–68.

[10] Mustafa Yılmaz, İnönü Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası, Selçuk Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi, No: 8, Konya, 1999, p. 19.

[11] Mehmet Gönlübol-Cem Sar, Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1939), Ankara, 1996, p. 158.

[12] Mustafa Yılmaz, i.b.i.d. , p. 20.

[13] Cemil Koçak, p. 141.

[14] Baskın Oran, p. 395.

[15] İsmail Soysal, Türk Dış Politikası incelemeleri İçin Kılavuz, İstanbul, 1993, p.15.

[16] Osman Akandere, Milli Şef Dönemi, İstanbul, 1988, p. 273.

[17] Rıfat Uçarol, Siyasi Tarih, İstanbul, 1995, p. 646.

[18] Mustafa Yılmaz, i.b.i.d. , p. 23.

[19] Cemil Koçak, i.b.i.d. , pp. 273-274.

[20]Osman Akandere, p. 315.